Synaesthesia is a condition in which one type of stimulation evokes the sensation of another, as when the hearing of a sound produces photisms, i.e. mental percepts of colours. R is a 20 year old colour blind subject who, in addition to the relatively common grapheme-colour synaesthesia, presents a rarely reported cross modal perception in which a variety of visual stimuli elicit aura-like percepts of colour. In R, photisms seem to be closely related to the affective valence of stimuli and (...) typically bring out a consistent pattern of emotional responses. The present case study suggests that colours might be an intrinsic category of the human brain. We developed an empirical methodology that allowed us to study the subject's otherwise inaccessible phenomenological experience. First, we found that R shows a Stroop effect elicited by photisms despite the fact that he does not show a regular Stroop with real colours. Secondly, by manipulating the colour context we confirmed that colours can alter R's emotional evaluation of the stimuli. Furthermore, we demonstrated that R's auras may actually lead to a partially inverted emotional spectrum where certain stimuli bring out emotional reactions opposite to the normal ones. These findings can only be accounted for by considering R's subjective colour experience or qualia. Therefore the present paper defends the view that qualia are a useful scientific concept that can be approached and studied by experimental methods. (shrink)

Synaesthesia is a condition in which one type of stimulation evokes the sensation of another, as when the hearing of a sound produces photisms, i.e. mental percepts of colours. R is a 20 year old colour blind subject who, in addition to the relatively common grapheme-colour synaesthesia, presents a rarely reported cross modal perception in which a variety of visual stimuli elicit aura-like percepts of colour. In R, photisms seem to be closely related to the affective valence of stimuli and (...) typically bring out a consistent pattern of emotional responses. The present case study suggests that colours might be an intrinsic category of the human brain. We developed an empirical methodology that allowed us to study the subject's otherwise inaccessible phenomenological experience. First, we found that R shows a Stroop effect (delayed response due to interference) elicited by photisms despite the fact that he does not show a regular Stroop with real colours. Secondly, by manipulating the colour context we confirmed that colours can alter R's emotional evaluation of the stimuli. Furthermore, we demonstrated that R's auras may actually lead to a partially inverted emotional spectrum where certain stimuli bring out emotional reactions opposite to the normal ones. These findings can only be accounted for by considering R's subjective colour experience or qualia. Therefore the present paper defends the view that qualia are a useful scientific concept that can be approached and studied by experimental methods. (shrink)

Belnap–Dunn’s relevance logic, \(\textsf{BD}\), was designed seeking a suitable logical device for dealing with multiple information sources which sometimes may provide inconsistent and/or incomplete pieces of information. \(\textsf{BD}\) is a four-valued logic which is both paraconsistent and paracomplete. On the other hand, De and Omori, while investigating what classical negation amounts to in a paracomplete and paraconsistent four-valued setting, proposed the expansion \(\textsf{BD2}\) of the four valued Belnap–Dunn logic by a classical negation. In this paper, we introduce a four-valued expansion (...) of BD called \({\textsf{BD}^\copyright }\), obtained by adding an unary connective \({\copyright }\,\ \) which is a consistency operator (in the sense of the Logics of Formal Inconsistency, _LFI_s). In addition, this operator is the unique one with the following features: it extends to \(\textsf{BD}\) the consistency operator of LFI1, a well-known three-valued _LFI_, still satisfying axiom _ciw_ (which states that any sentence is either consistent or contradictory), and allowing to define an undeterminedness operator (in the sense of Logic of Formal Undeterminedness, _LFU_s). Moreover, \({\textsf{BD}^\copyright }\) is maximal w.r.t. LFI1, and it is proved to be equivalent to BD2, up to signature. After presenting a natural Hilbert-style characterization of \({\textsf{BD}^\copyright }\) obtained by means of twist-structures semantics, we propose a first-order version of \({\textsf{BD}^\copyright }\) called \({\textsf{QBD}^\copyright }\), with semantics based on an appropriate notion of four-valued Tarskian-like structures called \(\textbf{4}\) -structures. We show that in \({\textsf{QBD}^\copyright }\), the existential and universal quantifiers are interdefinable in terms of the paracomplete and paraconsistent negation, and not by means of the classical negation. Finally, a Hilbert-style calculus for \({\textsf{QBD}^\copyright }\) is presented, proving the corresponding soundness and completeness theorems. (shrink)

The 3-valued paraconsistent logic Ciore was developed by Carnielli, Marcos and de Amo under the name LFI2, in the study of inconsistent databases from the point of view of logics of formal inconsistency (LFIs). They also considered a first-order version of Ciore called LFI2*. The logic Ciore enjoys extreme features concerning propagation and retropropagation of the consistency operator: a formula is consistent if and only if some of its subformulas is consistent. In addition, Ciore is algebraizable in the sense of (...) Blok and Pigozzi. On the other hand, the logic LFI2* satisfies a somewhat counter-intuitive property: the universal and the existential quantifier are inter-definable by means of the paraconsistent negation, as it happens in classical first-order logic with respect to the classical negation. This feature seems to be unnatural, given that both quantifiers have the classical meaning in LFI2*, and that this logic does not satisfy the De Morgan laws with respect to its paraconsistent negation. The first goal of the present article is to introduce a first-order version of Ciore (which we call QCiore) preserving the spirit of Ciore, that is, without introducing unexpected relationships between the quantifiers. The second goal of the article is to adapt to QCiore the partial structures semantics for the first-order paraconsistent logic LPT1 introduced by Coniglio and Silvestrini, which generalizes the semantic notion of quasi-truth considered by Mikeberg, da Costa and Chuaqui. Finally, some important results of classical Model Theory are obtained for this logic, such as Robinson’s joint consistency theorem, amalgamation and interpolation. Although we focus on QCiore, this framework can be adapted to other 3-valued first-order LFIs. (shrink)

Subjects and Simulations presents essays focused on suffering and sublimity, representation and subjectivity, and the relation of truth and appearance through engagement with the legacies of Jean Baudrillard and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe.

Health equity is a global concern. Although health equity extends far beyond the equitable distribution of healthcare, equitable access to healthcare is essential to the achievement of health equity. In Canada, Indigenous Peoples experience inequities in health and healthcare access. Cultural safety and trauma‐ and violence‐informed care have been proposed as models of care to improve healthcare access, yet practitioners lack guidance on how to implement these models. In this paper, we build upon an existing framework of equity‐oriented care for (...) primary healthcare settings by proposing strategies to guide nurses in operationalizing cultural safety and trauma‐ and violence‐informed care into nursing practice at the individual level. This component is one strategy to redress inequitable access to care among Indigenous Peoples in Canada. We conceptualize barriers to accessing healthcare as intrapersonal, interpersonal, and structural. We then define three domains for nursing action: practicing reflexivity, prioritizing relationships, and considering the context. We have applied this expanded framework within the context of Indigenous Peoples in Canada as a way of illustrating specific concepts and focusing our argument; however, this framework is relevant to other groups experiencing marginalizing conditions and inequitable access to healthcare, and thus is applicable to many areas of nursing practice. (shrink)

Inequities in access to oncology care among Indigenous peoples in Canada are well documented. Access to oncology care is mediated by a range of factors; however, emerging evidence suggests that healthcare providers, including nurses, play a significant role in shaping healthcare access. The purpose of this study was to critically examine access to oncology care among Indigenous peoples in Canada from the perspective of oncology nurses. Guided by postcolonial theoretical perspectives, interpretive descriptive and critical discourse analysis methodologies informed study design (...) and data analysis. Oncology nurses were recruited from across Canada to complete an online survey (n = 78). Nurses identified a range of barriers experienced by Indigenous peoples when accessing oncology care, yet located these barriers primarily at the individual and systems levels. Nurses perceived themselves as mediators of access to oncology care; however, their efforts to facilitate access to care were constrained by the dominance of biomedicine within healthcare. Nurses' constructions of access to oncology care highlight the embedded narrative of individualism within nursing practice and the relative invisibility of racism as a determinant of equitable access to care among Indigenous peoples. This suggests a need for oncology nurses to better understand and incorporate structural determinants of health perspectives. (shrink)

This article is part of a For-Discussion-Section of Methods of Information in Medicine about the paper "Biomedical Informatics: We Are What We Publish", written by Peter L. Elkin, Steven H. Brown, and Graham Wright. It is introduced by an editorial. This article contains the combined commentaries invited to independently comment on the Elkin et al. paper. In subsequent issues the discussion can continue through letters to the editor.

BackgroundPreprint usage is growing rapidly in the life sciences; however, questions remain on the relative quality of preprints when compared to published articles. An objective dimension of quality that is readily measurable is completeness of reporting, as transparency can improve the reader’s ability to independently interpret data and reproduce findings.MethodsIn this observational study, we initially compared independent samples of articles published in bioRxiv and in PubMed-indexed journals in 2016 using a quality of reporting questionnaire. After that, we performed paired comparisons (...) between preprints from bioRxiv to their own peer-reviewed versions in journals.ResultsPeer-reviewed articles had, on average, higher quality of reporting than preprints, although the difference was small, with absolute differences of 5.0% [95% CI 1.4, 8.6] and 4.7% [95% CI 2.4, 7.0] of reported items in the independent samples and paired sample comparison, respectively. There were larger differences favoring peer-reviewed articles in subjective ratings of how clearly titles and abstracts presented the main findings and how easy it was to locate relevant reporting information. Changes in reporting from preprints to peer-reviewed versions did not correlate with the impact factor of the publication venue or with the time lag from bioRxiv to journal publication.ConclusionsOur results suggest that, on average, publication in a peer-reviewed journal is associated with improvement in quality of reporting. They also show that quality of reporting in preprints in the life sciences is within a similar range as that of peer-reviewed articles, albeit slightly lower on average, supporting the idea that preprints should be considered valid scientific contributions. (shrink)

Bundel essays over aspecten van het denken van de Duitse filosoof Martin Heidegger (1889-1976).

Throughout the biological and biomedical sciences there is a growing need for, prescriptive ‘minimum information’ (MI) checklists specifying the key information to include when reporting experimental results are beginning to find favor with experimentalists, analysts, publishers and funders alike. Such checklists aim to ensure that methods, data, analyses and results are described to a level sufficient to support the unambiguous interpretation, sophisticated search, reanalysis and experimental corroboration and reuse of data sets, facilitating the extraction of maximum value from data sets (...) them. However, such ‘minimum information’ MI checklists are usually developed independently by groups working within representatives of particular biologically- or technologically-delineated domains. Consequently, an overview of the full range of checklists can be difficult to establish without intensive searching, and even tracking thetheir individual evolution of single checklists may be a non-trivial exercise. Checklists are also inevitably partially redundant when measured one against another, and where they overlap is far from straightforward. Furthermore, conflicts in scope and arbitrary decisions on wording and sub-structuring make integration difficult. This presents inhibit their use in combination. Overall, these issues present significant difficulties for the users of checklists, especially those in areas such as systems biology, who routinely combine information from multiple biological domains and technology platforms. To address all of the above, we present MIBBI (Minimum Information for Biological and Biomedical Investigations); a web-based communal resource for such checklists, designed to act as a ‘one-stop shop’ for those exploring the range of extant checklist projects, and to foster collaborative, integrative development and ultimately promote gradual integration of checklists. (shrink)

Do we directly perceive physical objects? What is the significance of the qualification ‘directly’ here? Austin famously denied that there was a unique interpretation by which we could make sense of the traditional debate in the philosophy of perception. I look here at Thompson Clarke’s discussion of G. E. Moore and surface perception to answer Austin’s scepticism.

This introduction to the Common Knowledge symposium titled “Comparative Relativism” outlines a variety of intellectual contexts where placing the unlikely companion terms comparison and relativism in conjunction offers analytical purchase. If comparison, in the most general sense, involves the investigation of discrete contexts in order to elucidate their similarities and differences, then relativism, as a tendency, stance, or working method, usually involves the assumption that contexts exhibit, or may exhibit, radically different, incomparable, or incommensurable traits. Comparative studies are required to (...) treat their objects as alike, at least in some crucial respects; relativism indicates the limits of this practice. Jensen argues that this seeming paradox is productive, as he moves across contexts, from Lévi-Strauss's analysis of comparison as an anthropological method to Peter Galison's history of physics, and on to the anthropological, philosophical, and historical examples offered in symposium contributions by Barbara Herrnstein Smith, Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, Marilyn Strathern, and Isabelle Stengers. Comparative relativism is understood by some to imply that relativism comes in various kinds and that these have multiple uses, functions, and effects, varying widely in different personal, historical, and institutional contexts that can be compared and contrasted. Comparative relativism is taken by others to encourage a “comparison of comparisons,” in order to relativize what different peoples—say, Western academics and Amerindian shamans—compare things “for.” Jensen concludes that what is compared and relativized in this symposium are the methods of comparison and relativization themselves. He ventures that the contributors all hope that treating these terms in juxtaposition may allow for new configurations of inquiry. (shrink)

THE AUTHOR, THOUGH CRITICAL OF MARTIN’S BOOK, "RELIGIOUS BELIEF", DEFENDS MARTIN FROM THE CRITICISMS OF ROWE AND PLANTINGA BECAUSE THE LATTER HAVE NOT "MADE THEIR CASE" IN CLAIMING THERE IS A CONTRADICTION INVOLVED IN THE ARGUMENT THAT CHRIST AND GOD ARE THE SAME. (STAFF).

The relation between theory and practice is the object of a central debate in the history of science. In a recent contribution to the issue, L. E. Sandelands equates practice with G. Ryle's "knowing how" and theory with Ryle's "knowing that," arguing that practice and theory are incommensurate forms of knowing such that theory cannot be translated into practice. R. T. Craig took issue with Sandelands' position, pointing out that it reflects an academic approach removed from everyday social behavior in (...) which problem solving is always both practical and theoretical. The authors agree and take this blurring of the theory/practice dichotomy as a cue to deconstruct the conception of two ways of knowing. J. Shotter's concepts of "joint action" and "knowing from within" suggest a third type of knowing which develops between knowers in particular contexts or circumstances. This third way of knowing has important implications for psychological training and inquiry. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

El presente artículo se propone indagar los problemas que hacen al déficit de legitimidad de lo que ha dado en llamarse la "justicia política", esto es, las respuestas judiciales frente a herencias de criminalidad política. Sugerimos que se trata de problemas estructurales que están en los límites de lo jurídico y que, por tanto, no constituyen una falla del sistema judicial en sí mismo. Con ese fin, sobre la base de los análisis realizados por Danilo Zolo y Hannah Arendt, examinamos (...) problemas estructurales en tres niveles: en la imparcialidad e independencia del tribunal, en el respeto de los principios, las normas y los procedimientos del derecho, y en el requisito de un elemento subjetivo para atribuir la responsabilidad penal de un crimen. Le propos de notre article est celui de s'interroger sur les problèmes qui produisent un déficit de légitimité en ce qu'on a appelé la " justice politique ", c'est-à-dire, les réponses judiciaires qu'on donne au legs de criminalité politique. Nous suggérons qu'il s'agit de problèmes structurels qui se situent à la limite du juridique et qui, par conséquent, ne constituent pas une faille du système juridique lui-même. Dans ce but, et sur la base des analyses réalisées par Danilo Zolo et Hannah Arendt, nous examinons trois types des problèmes : ceux qui tiennent à l'impartialité et à l'indépendance du tribunal, ceux concernant le respect des principes, normes et procédures du droit, et celui lié a l'exigence d'un élément subjectif dans l'attribution de la responsabilité pénale d'un crime. (shrink)

A common finding is that information order influences belief revision (e.g., Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992). We tested personal experience as a possible mitigator. In three experiments participants experienced the probabilistic relationship between pieces of information and object category through a series of trials where they assigned objects (planes) into one of two possible categories (hostile or commercial), given two sequentially presented pieces of probabilistic information (route and ID), and then they had to indicate their belief about the object category before (...) feedback. The results generally confirm the predictions from the Hogarth and Einhorn model. Participants showed a recency effect in their belief revision. Extending previous model evaluations the results indicate that the model predictions also hold for classification decisions, and for pieces of information that vary in their diagnostic values. Personal experience does not appear to prevent order effects in classification decisions based on sequentially presented pieces of information and in belief revision. (shrink)

Prior research suggests that interviewers play an important role in representing their organization and in making the interview a pleasant experience for applicants. This study examined whether impression management used by interviewers (organization-enhancement and applicant-enhancement) is perceived by applicants, and how it influences applicants’ attitudes, intentions, and emotions. Adopting a signaling perspective, this article argues that applicants’ positive attitudes and intentions towards the organization increase if interviewers not only enhance the organization, but if the signals they sent (i.e., organization-enhancement) are (...) actually received by the applicant. Similarly, applicants’ positive emotions should increase if interviewers not only enhance the applicant, but if the signals they send (i.e., applicant-enhancement) are actually received by the applicant. A field study which involved video coding interviewers’ impression management behavior during 153 selection interviews and pre- and post-interview applicant surveys showed that the signals sent by interviewers during the interview were received by applicants. In addition, applicants rated the organization’s prestige and their own positive affect after the interview more positively when they perceived higher levels of organization-enhancement during the interview. Furthermore, applicants reported more positive affect and interview self-efficacy after the interview when they perceived higher levels of interviewer applicant-enhancement. We also found an indirect effect of interviewers’ organization-enhancement on organizational prestige through applicants’ perceptions of organization-enhancement as well as indirect effects of interviewers’ applicant-enhancement on applicants’ positive affect and interview self-efficacy through applicants’ perceptions of applicant-enhancement. Our findings contribute to an integrated understanding of the effects of interviewer impression management and point out both risks and chances in selling and smooth-talking towards applicants. (shrink)

Current economic ontology development has failed to confront two important errors associated with historicism. Embracing the linearity of economic value being directly attributed to the labor applied to natural resources taken together with efficiency arguments used to justify monetary policy on both the microlevel (transaction) and macrolevel (global trade), we know these legacies of the scientific method applied to economic systems have left the G-20 paralyzed to deal with structural failings evidenced from banking to business to economic policy. An exploration (...) of the structural modalities that impair our current capacity for adaptation and alternative methods for accounting for value is the basis for this inquiry. Integral accounting is proposed as a more suitable method to transition from scarcity-based market models to abundance-based modes of sustainable engagement. (shrink)

This book is built upon the premiss that there is more than a heuristic connection between Heidegger's thought and his accounts of the Pre-Socratics. Accordingly, by studying what Heidegger has said about them and why he has said it, Seidel offers explanations of some key Heideggerian themes, such as history, being, truth, and language. Seidel brings to this task a sound and thorough reading of both the Pre-Socratics and Heidegger and succeeds in illuminating some of Heidegger's basic concepts.—W. G. E.

A well-defined, methodically executed, minutely documented piece of scholarship. The genre is a sociological-historical analysis of the "status" of the Florentine humanists, carried out at a rather low level of empirical generalization issuing in a theory that common sense and everyday experience would have supplied unaided. "Social position" is seen to depend on the presence of one or more frequently interdependent factors: wealth, family background, political achievements, good marriage. The careers of a vast number of representative humanists are detailed as (...) evidence. The sheer opulence of the detailed information testifies to Martines' persistent hard work and undoubtedly makes the book an important contribution to the field. It becomes evident that many of the humanists were substantial citizens, not foot-loose bohemians, and that they observed the Florentine tradition of responsible citizenship to a high degree.—W. G. E. (shrink)

This book is built upon the premiss that there is more than a heuristic connection between Heidegger's thought and his accounts of the Pre-Socratics. Accordingly, by studying what Heidegger has said about them and why he has said it, Seidel offers explanations of some key Heideggerian themes, such as history, being, truth, and language. Seidel brings to this task a sound and thorough reading of both the Pre-Socratics and Heidegger and succeeds in illuminating some of Heidegger's basic concepts.—W. G. E.

We explore the complexity of Sacks’ Splitting Theorem in terms of the mind change functions associated with the members of the splits. We prove that, for any c.e. set A, there are low computably enumerable sets $A_0\sqcup A_1=A$ splitting A with $A_0$ and $A_1$ both totally $\omega ^2$ -c.a. in terms of the Downey–Greenberg hierarchy, and this result cannot be improved to totally $\omega $ -c.a. as shown in [9]. We also show that if cone avoidance is added then there (...) is no level below $\varepsilon _0$ which can be used to characterize the complexity of $A_1$ and $A_2$. (shrink)

An exploration of the influence of Scottish Common Sense Philosophy on early nineteenth century American attitudes toward fiction and the imagination. Martin first shows the great appeal of this movement, which became a semi-official philosophy in America. He suggests that it was attractive to Americans because "it stabilized, it was safe, it discouraged undue speculation." In reaction to this stolid philosophic outlook emerged a quest for a free, more dynamic concept of the imagination.--G. E. S.

We solve a longstanding question of Soare by showing that if ${\mathbf d}$ is a non-low $_2$ computably enumerable degree then ${\mathbf d}$ contains a c.e. set with no r-maximal c.e. superset.